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Introduction
We should evaluate views on free will and moral responsibility in terms of a philosophical 
cost–benefit analysis. The benefits of a view must be carefully weighed against its costs. 
My main topic here is one alleged cost of libertarianism: it appears to imply that our 
status as free agents who are morally responsible for our behavior ‘hangs on a thread.’ 
Libertarianism depends on whether the (arguably) empirical thesis of causal deter-
minism is true. The problem is not that our status as free agents would depend on an 
empirical thesis as such—it is that our status would depend on that sort of empirical 
thesis. Specifically, our free agency would depend on whether the laws of nature have 
associated with them 100 percent probabilities, instead of 95 percent or 99 percent 
probabilities. It seems curious that this sort of difference should change our status as 
free and morally responsible agents.
I am going to argue that it is a cost of libertarianism that it holds our status as agents 
hostage to theoretical physics, but that claim has met with disagreement. Some liber-
tarians regard it as the cost of doing business, not a philosophical liability. By contrast, 
Peter van Inwagen has addressed the worry head on. He says that if he were to become 
convinced that causal determinism were true, he would not change his view that 
humans are free and morally responsible. Rather, he would give up at least one of 
the formerly-thought-to-be a priori truths that are elements in his argument for the 
incompatibility of causal determinism and the relevant sort of freedom. Thus, accord-
ing to van Inwagen, our status as free and morally responsible agents would not be held 
hostage to the physicists or hang on a thread.
I think that van Inwagen’s strategy for securing our freedom and responsibility is 
unattractive. Somewhat tendentiously, I have called the rejection of an a priori ingredi-
ent in the incompatibilist’s argument, contingent upon learning that causal determin-
ism is true, ‘metaphysical flip-flopping.’1 And it does seem that van Inwagen’s approach 
1 The term ‘metaphysical flip-flopping’ was introduced in Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 253–4.
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is implausible insofar as he is open to such metaphysical flip-flopping. That he is open 
to it—that he would flip-flop if he became convinced of the truth of causal determin-
ism—is a problem for his actual philosophical position. Or so I will argue.
In this essay, I will try to pinpoint and elaborate the problem with metaphysical 
flip-flopping. I’ll thus defend the contention that libertarian views face the worry that 
they render our status as free and responsible agents unduly at the mercy of certain 
discoveries of the physicists. I will also argue that libertarian theists—libertarians who 
also believe in God—are subject to a structurally parallel worry. That is, given the 
rejection of the strategy involving the possibility of metaphysical flip-flopping, liber-
tarian theists would appear to have to give up their belief in God, if they were convinced 
that causal determinism were true. But, again, this is a significant price to pay for one’s 
view about the conditions for free will: one’s religious views would be held hostage to a 
certain sort of empirical discovery. Given the nature of religious beliefs and the nature 
of this sort of empirical discovery—that, say, the laws of nature have associated with 
them 100 percent probabilities rather than lower ones—it seems implausible that the 
religious beliefs should be held hostage to the possibility of the empirical discovery. 
The upshot of the discussion is to highlight one cost of libertarianism, which must be 
placed on the scales when evaluating positions on free will. Of course, no view comes 
without its costs, and the cost I will be highlighting is only one among a wider set of 
considerations. Nevertheless, I contend that this cost of accepting libertarianism is 
not insignificant.
The Consequence Argument
As I use the term here, libertarianism is the doctrine that human beings are free in the 
sense required for moral responsibility and that such freedom is incompatible with 
causal determinism. I further stipulate, at least for this part of the discussion, that the 
freedom in question involves freedom to do otherwise. To draw the problem with 
flip-flopping into view, I’ll consider an influential and highly plausible argument for 
the incompatibility of causal determinism and freedom to do otherwise. This is 
one version—a ‘modal’ version—of a family of arguments called the ‘Consequence 
Argument,’ so named by Peter van Inwagen to mark the fact that under causal deter-
minism, all of our choices and actions are the (deterministic) consequences of the past 
and the laws of nature.2
The version of the Consequence Argument I shall present is a ‘modal’ version because 
it employs a certain modal principle: the Principle of the Transfer of Powerlessness.3 In 
stating this principle, it will be helpful to have some definitions at hand. When a prop-
osition p obtains and a person S does not have it in his power so to act that p would not 
2 Van Inwagen 1983.
3 In the presentation of the modal version of the Consequence Argument, I draw heavily on Fischer and 
Ravizza 1998, 18–21.
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obtain, I’ll say that p is ‘power necessary’ relative to S.4 Power necessity is that kind of 
necessity which implies that a person does not have control over whether a proposition 
is true. When a proposition is power necessary relative to a person, the proposition in 
fact obtains and the person has ‘no choice’ about whether the proposition obtains. The 
abbreviation, ‘NS,T (p)’ will stand for: it is power necessary for S at time T that p—that 
is, p obtains and S is not free at T to perform any action such that if S were to perform it, 
p would not obtain.
Consider now the Principle of the Transfer of Powerlessness:
1. If NS,T (p) and
2. NS,T (If p, then q), then
3. NS,T (q).
Roughly, the principle says that if a person is powerless over one thing, and powerless 
over that thing’s leading to another, then the person is powerless over the other. Slightly 
more carefully, the principle says that if p obtains and a person S cannot so act that p 
would be false, and S cannot so act that it would be false that if p then q, then q obtains 
and S cannot so act that q would be false.
A second ingredient in the modal version of the Consequence Argument captures 
the intuitive idea that the past is currently ‘fixed’ and out of our control. Here is one 
way of putting the idea: no person can act in such a way that some fact about the past 
would not have been a fact. Put differently, the thought is that if a person’s performing 
a certain action would require some actual fact about the past not to have been a fact, 
then the person cannot perform the act. This might be called the Principle of the Fixity 
of the Past.
A further ingredient captures the similar idea that the laws of nature are fixed and 
out of our control. Intuitively, no human being can act in such a way that some natural 
law would not be a law. In other words, the Principle of the Fixity of the Laws says that 
if a person’s performing a certain action would require that some actual natural law not 
be a law, then the person cannot perform the act.
Let’s define causal determinism as the thesis that implies (whatever else it implies) 
that, for any given time, a complete statement of the facts about that time, together 
with a complete statement of the laws of nature, entails every truth as to what hap-
pens afterwards. Now the modal version of the Consequence Argument can be 
stated informally as follows. Suppose that causal determinism obtains and that some 
ordinary agent, Wilson, does something at a certain time: he mows his lawn on 
Wednesday afternoon. It follows from causal determinism that conditions obtaining 
in the past (say, on Monday), together with the laws of nature, entail that Wilson 
mows his lawn on Wednesday afternoon. And since Wilson has no control over the 
past, and Wilson has no control over the laws of nature, it follows (given the 
Principle of the Transfer of Powerlessness) that Wilson is not free between Monday 
4 The term ‘power necessary’ was introduced by Carl Ginet. See Ginet 1980, 171–86.
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and Wednesday afternoon (say, on Wednesday morning) to refrain from mowing on 
Wednesday afternoon.
A slightly more careful statement of the argument is in order. Given that causal 
determinism is true, there is some statement of the conditions of the world at T1, b, 
which, together with the laws of nature, entails that S does act A at T3. Since nobody 
has control over the past,
1. NS,T2 (b at T1).
And since nobody has control over the laws of nature,
2. NS,T2 (If b at T1, then S does A at T3).
Thus, by the Principle of the Transfer of Powerlessness, it follows that
3. NS,T2 (S does A at T3).
The argument employs plausible ingredients to reach the result that causal determinism 
is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise—the freedom that most libertarians 
presume is required for moral responsibility. There are other versions of the 
Consequence Argument, but for our purposes this modal version will do.
Van Inwagen’s Flip-flopping
The Consequence Argument’s conclusion—that causal determinism is incompatible 
with free will, in the sense presumed to be required for moral responsibility—is dis-
turbing. After all, causal determinism is an empirical thesis that might turn out to be 
true. We do not know for certain that it is false, and so our status as free and morally 
responsible agents is called into question.
As already noted, van Inwagen has a strategy that seeks to secure our fundamental 
status as free and morally responsible. He says that in the unlikely event that he were 
convinced of the truth of causal determinism, he would not conclude that, despite appear-
ances to the contrary, we are not in fact free and morally responsible. Rather, he would give 
up one of the previously-thought-to-be a priori true elements of the Consequence 
Argument. Van Inwagen says that he would reject what I have called the Principle of 
the Transfer of Powerlessness (van Inwagen’s ‘Principle Beta’). He writes:
I have defended [Beta, i.e. the Principle of the Transfer of Powerlessness] entirely on a priori 
grounds. But it would not surprise me too much to find that this proposition, which at present 
seems to me to be a truth of reason, had been refuted by the progress of science. Such refuta-
tions have happened many times. And it does not follow from the fact that they have happened 
that there is anything wrong with accepting on a priori grounds a principle that later turns out 
to be empirically refutable. One must simply realize that a priori convictions are as corrigible 
as any others.5
5 Van Inwagen 1983, 221.
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This strikes me as problematic. Van Inwagen’s willingness to reject the modal transfer 
principle merely on the supposition that he would become convinced of the truth of 
causal determinism is unappealing—it makes for bad epistemology. I hope to explain 
the source of my concern.
Notice first that there appears to be a difference between the dialectical situation 
here and the sorts of situations van Inwagen envisions when he writes of principles that 
had appeared to be truths of reason but were then ‘refuted by the progress of science.’ 
Let’s say there is a principle P that we take to be an a priori truth. Science gradually 
progresses to the stage where P, joined with newly developed scientific principles, 
entails some further proposition that is clearly and indisputably empirically refutable. 
Then we would rightly abandon what we once took to be an a priori true principle.
Importantly, our giving up principle P in the envisaged context is different than van 
Inwagen’s giving up the modal principle in the Consequence Argument upon discov-
ering that causal determinism is true. The Principle of the Transfer of Powerlessness 
is initially regarded as a priori true, but then science marches onward and causal 
determinism is established as true. So now scientific principles, causal determinism 
included, as well as the modal principle, entail that we are not free and morally respon-
sible. Although van Inwagen wishes to resist this entailment because he’s so confident 
that we are free and morally responsible, it is not clearly and indisputably empirically 
refutable that we lack freedom and moral responsibility. That’s a crucial difference 
between the two contexts. Whether we are free and morally responsible is controversial 
and can’t be settled by empirical means alone. (One more thing: the entailed putatively 
empirical proposition is precisely the proposition at issue in the dialectical context; it 
then seems especially problematic to employ an antecedent view about this proposition 
as part of a project of ‘reverse engineering’ the argument.) To be sure, we sometimes 
sensibly rethink our commitment to principles earlier deemed a priori truths, as we see 
in the example involving principle P. But that fact does not by itself make the disposi-
tion to metaphysical flip-flopping appropriate for van Inwagen.
In An Essay on Free Will, van Inwagen discusses the problems associated with inde-
terministic conceptions of freedom and moral responsibility. He admits that it is ‘puz-
zling’ how an agent can genuinely be in control of his behavior, given indeterminism 
(in the relevant places along the sequence). But he also admits that it is nevertheless 
‘inconceivable’ that causal determinism is compatible with freedom and moral respon-
sibility. Van Inwagen is quite confident that we are indeed free and morally responsible 
even though he can’t fully explain how we are. And so he confesses: ‘I must choose 
between the puzzling and the inconceivable. I choose the puzzling.’6
But is this right? Is it really inconceivable for van Inwagen that causal determinism is 
compatible with freedom and moral responsibility? After all, as I’ve already noted, he 
has written that, if he were to be convinced of the truth of causal determinism, he would 
give up the Principle of the Transfer of Powerlessness and embrace compatibilism. My 
6 Van Inwagen 1983, 150.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/05/2016, SPi
The Problem of Flip-flopping 53
question is simple: how then could it be inconceivable that compatibilism is true? Perhaps 
van Inwagen’s point is that at the present moment—in the absence of a compelling 
reason to accept causal determinism—it is inconceivable to him that compatibilism is 
also true, but that if he were convinced of the truth of causal determinism, it would 
(under those rather different circumstances) be conceivable to him that compatibilism 
is true. But this seems strange and a little awkward. If it would be conceivable under the 
envisaged circumstances that compatibilism is true, why isn’t it now so conceivable, 
even in the absence of a belief in causal determinism? If one believes that under the 
counterfactual circumstances in question, there would be no barrier to conceiving 
of the truth of compatibilism, why is there now a barrier to conceiving of the truth of 
compatibilism? The change in the circumstances appears to be irrelevant to the con-
ceivability of compatibilism. So why not ‘bring it home’? That is, why not ‘bring home’ 
the claim about conceivability to the present circumstance?7
Recall that van Inwagen sums up his theoretical choice as follows: ‘I must choose 
between the puzzling [libertarianism] and the inconceivable [compatibilism]. I choose 
the puzzling.’8 But that isn’t quite right. Van Inwagen can and should ‘bring home’ the 
conceivability of compatibilism, given what he says about his disposition to flip-flop, 
upon learning that causal determinism is true. But there is more to say here. I want to 
push even further and challenge van Inwagen’s libertarianism itself. It’s not clear why 
he shouldn’t also ‘bring home’ belief in compatibilism to his current situation, given his 
flip-flopping disposition. Let us turn to that now.
The Flip-flopping Problem
Here is a quick initial statement of my argument. The disposition to flip-flop commits 
van Inwagen to this: if he were to learn that causal determinism (‘determinism’ for 
short) is true, he would reject the Principle of the Transfer of Powerlessness (‘Principle’ 
for short). Would he reject the Principle for no reason, aside from his desire to avoid 
the conclusion it would lead to, or would he have some reason to reject the Principle? 
Rejecting the Principle merely to avoid an unwanted conclusion seems problematic. 
And it likewise seems problematic to evaluate evidence differently simply to dodge an 
unwanted conclusion. So, I will assume that van Inwagen thinks that there would be 
some reason to reject the Principle, were he convinced that determinism is true. But 
then why would that reason only exist in the counterfactual scenario? Switching from 
the actual situation (where van Inwagen doesn’t believe that determinism obtains) to the 
counterfactual situation (where van Inwagen does believe that determinism obtains) 
doesn’t appear to have any impact on the existence of the reason at issue. So, why not 
bring the reason home? And thus why not bring compatibilism home, too?
7 I am indebted to Michael Nelson for the suggestion that the ‘bringing it home’ metaphor applies to this 
sort of dialectical context; see Nelson 2011.
8 Van Inwagen 1983, 150.
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That was impressionistic, but allow me to develop this argument in more detail. 
What is so perplexing to me about van Inwagen’s position is: the truth of determinism 
doesn’t clearly have anything to do with the Principle. Learning that determinism is true 
does not seem to call for a different view of the Principle. But, again, van Inwagen’s 
view is that if he were to learn that determinism obtains, he would reject the Principle. 
How could this be a reasonable policy unless determinism is somehow evidentially 
related to the Principle?
Let me try out an initial thought on what the evidential relation might be. If learning 
that determinism is true would rationally change van Inwagen’s assessment of the 
Principle, then that’s because his evidence for the Principle depends on premises or 
assumptions that entail the falsity (or low probability) of determinism itself. In slightly 
different words: if by learning that determinism obtains, he would come to realize that 
the Principle needs a different assessment, then that’s just because the Principle had led 
him all along to assume that determinism is false (or improbable). Once he learns that 
determinism is true, so much the worse for the Principle.
That seems to be one way that learning that determinism obtains could be evidentially 
related to the Principle. But this account of the evidential connection is problematic. 
What is it about the Principle (or van Inwagen’s evidence for it) that presupposes that 
determinism is false? I haven’t the foggiest idea. The two seem evidentially unrelated. 
So, the present account appears to propose an entirely ad hoc evidential connection.
Van Inwagen may say that learning that determinism is true is relevant to the 
Principle in the following way. For starters, notice the obvious: learning that determin-
ism obtains, together with van Inwagen’s evidence for incompatibilism (the Principle 
included), implies that humans lack free will and moral responsibility. If determinism 
is correct, and if van Inwagen’s argument for incompatibilism is correct, there is no free 
will and moral responsibility. So, given what van Inwagen has learned about determin-
ism from the physicists, there must be some defect in some part of the argument for 
incompatibilism—since he thinks, of course, that we must have free will and moral 
responsibility. The defect in his argument is one that has so far gone unappreciated by 
him, but it is a defect nonetheless, and learning that determinism is true has revealed 
it to him. The idea here is that learning that determinism obtains is evidentially rele-
vant to van Inwagen’s assessment of the Principle because learning that determinism is 
true indicates that the Principle sneaks a defect into the argument. Van Inwagen can 
now see that the Principle must be mistaken, even if he doesn’t know what exactly the 
problem is.
It isn’t obvious to me why learning that determinism obtains must rationally change 
van Inwagen’s view of the Principle. We can grant that the Principle may have a hidden 
defect. But why must the defect rest right there? After all, the up-until-now unrecog-
nized trouble may rest instead with commitment to free will and moral responsibility, 
not with the Principle. That is at least enough to show it’s doubtful that there must be 
a defect with the Principle: learning that determinism is true, together with the argu-
ment for incompatibilism, does not entail that the Principle has a hidden defect, 
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because there may instead be a hidden defect with commitment to free will and 
moral responsibility.
I suspect that it’s in the spirit of van Inwagen’s position to reason along the following 
lines. If he learns that determinism is true, he realizes that there must be a hitherto 
hidden defect with his position. Where is the defect? When surveying his evidence for 
his position, it seems clear to him that his evidence for the Principle is weaker than his 
evidence for any other ingredient in his position. So, given the varying degrees of 
strength of his evidence for the other ingredients, it seems clear to him that the hidden 
defect is more likely to be found in the Principle than in his commitment to our free-
dom and responsibility or anything else. Thus, when he learns that determinism is 
true, he can rationally revise his assessment of the Principle, given that the defect 
is most likely found there.
All of this offers an account of an alleged evidential connection between learning 
that determinism is true and the Principle. Learning that determinism is true is 
 evidentially related to the Principle because learning as much reveals a hidden defect 
with the argument for incompatibilism and one that probably resides with the 
Principle. Even so, none of this makes van Inwagen’s metaphysical flip-flopping look 
attractive, I think. Recall, once more, that van Inwagen says that if he were to learn that 
determinism is true, he would reject the Principle. This account of the evidential con-
nection assumes that learning that determinism is true only reveals an up-until-now 
hidden defect with the Principle. What van Inwagen learns doesn’t create the defect—it 
merely makes it known. But note well: the account thus implies that the Principle is 
problematic even before van Inwagen learns that determinism is true. So, by adopting 
this account of the evidential connection between learning that determinism is true 
and the Principle, van Inwagen must accept that the Principle is dubious. Therefore, in 
his actual situation, there is already reason to give up the Principle. And it would seem 
odd to suppose that, although there is already reason to give up the Principle, the rea-
son only becomes decisive when van Inwagen discovers that causal determinism is 
true! That is, there is no evidential connection between discovering that causal deter-
minism obtains and the Principle which is such that discovering that causal determin-
ism obtains would put the evidence against the Principle ‘over the top,’ as it were.
Contrast this situation with one provided in correspondence with Dan Speak, 
who writes:
Suppose I rebuild a classic car. In doing so, I had special trouble getting the transmission into 
form (it’s an especially tricky part of the machine). So, before I turn the key to take it for an 
initial spin, I think to myself, ‘If I can’t get this thing to drive properly, the problem is likely with 
the transmission.’ Does admitting this commit me to thinking that there is an actual problem 
with the transmission? Does it require me to give up my belief that the car will in fact run? It 
doesn’t seem so.
I agree. But this is because there is some evidential connection (in the context) between 
the car’s not running and the transmission’s having a problem; the fact that it doesn’t 
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run, when you turn the ignition key, is further evidence that there is a problem with the 
transmission. In contrast, the fact that causal determinism obtains would not be fur-
ther evidence that the Principle is false—or at least it is mysterious why this should be 
so. In the car case, you already suspect the transmission (for good reason). In the case 
of the argument for incompatibilism, van Inwagen does not already suspect the 
Principle; in fact, it is quite the contrary.
Let us take stock of my discussion of van Inwagen’s argumentative approach thus far. 
Suppose that van Inwagen learns that determinism is true. One possibility, which 
I have left aside, is that there would be no reason to reject the Principle. Another possi-
bility is that he has some reason to reject the Principle. I have explored what might 
allow him reasonably to reject it. The trouble, I think, is that if there is a reason to reject 
the Principle in the counterfactual scenario where physicists report that determinism 
is true, that reason is already present in the actual scenario. Thus, flip-flopping leads 
from libertarianism to compatibilism because it requires that there would be, and is, 
reason to reject the Principle.
Could there be another interpretation of van Inwagen’s argumentative strategy that 
I have overlooked? Here is one possibility.9 Plausibly, van Inwagen actually finds it 
highly improbable that determinism is true. Under the actual circumstances, and 
given his belief—to which he attaches a high probability—that we are free and morally 
responsible, he deems it more likely that all of the ingredients in the Consequence 
Argument are true than that compatibilism is. But if he were—per improbabile—to be 
convinced that determinism is true, then it would be a matter of giving up the proposi-
tion to which he would, under those circumstances, attach the lowest probability. And 
if he were to believe that causal determinism is true, he would attach a lower probabil-
ity to at least one of the ingredients in the Consequence Argument (namely, the 
Principle) than that we are not free and morally responsible. On this strategy, the idea 
is that van Inwagen is forced to reject at least one principle to which he had previously 
been attracted, and he rejects the least probable.
This strategy raises some similar issues to the ones I have already explored. What 
are the reasons for accepting certain principles and rejecting others? Going with-
out reasons here seems problematic. But, given that van Inwagen has learned that 
determinism is true, why is it plausible that the belief in free will and moral 
responsibility would be assigned a higher probability than the Principle (or other 
ingredients in the Consequence Argument, such as the Principle of the Fixity of 
the Past or the Principle of the Fixity of the Laws)? This would seem to suggest 
excessive confidence in our freedom and responsibility and perhaps an unattrac-
tive complacency.
To elaborate. Even for van Inwagen, our status as free and morally responsible is not 
immune to empirical discoveries. He doesn’t regard his belief in free will as empirically 
9 I am grateful to Derk Pereboom and Christopher Franklin for suggesting this possible interpretation 
of van Inwagen’s approach.
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indefeasible—in the sense that it is supported by reasons that cannot possibly be 
removed or defeated by empirical reasons. For instance, while arguing against the 
‘Paradigm Case Argument,’ van Inwagen writes that the following scenario is at least 
possible:
(M) When any human being is born, the Martians implant in his brain a tiny device—one that 
is undetectable by any observational technique we have at our disposal, though it is not in 
principle undetectable—which contains a ‘program’ for that person’s entire life: whenever that 
person must make a decision, the device causes him to decide one way or the other according 
to the requirements of a table of instructions that were incorporated into the structure of the 
device before that person was conceived.10
He goes on to say:
If we should discover that some particular person—Himmler, say—acted as he did because a 
Martian device, implanted in his brain at the moment of his birth, had caused all his  decisions, 
then we should hardly want to say that Himmler had free will, that he could have helped 
what he did, that he had any choice about the way he acted, or that he ever could have done 
otherwise. And I don’t see why matters should be different if we discovered that everyone 
was ‘directed’ by a Martian device: then we should have to make these judgments about 
everyone.11
Of course, it is possible that van Inwagen would give up his association of moral 
responsibility with freedom to do otherwise, were he to become convinced of (M). 
But he doesn’t endorse this move, and I will assume that, if he were to be convinced 
that (M) were true, he would give up his view that we are free and morally respon-
sible. And a similar point seems to apply to the discovery that determinism is 
true. Thus, van Inwagen’s belief that we are free and morally responsible agents 
cannot be an empirically indefeasible belief—it can be challenged or defeated by 
empirical facts.
Martians and brain implants to the side, it would seem that our status as free agents 
can be called into question by other empirical hypotheses. Consider for instance the 
theses emerging from the ‘situationist’ and ‘automaticity’ literatures in psychology. 
According to certain interpretations of the experimental results, human behavior is 
largely driven by our emotions and ‘cues’ from our environment, not ‘reasons.’ If these 
contentions are true—and of course they are highly controversial—then it would at 
least be plausible that our status as free and morally responsible agents would be called 
into question. More generally, and for many reasons, moral-responsibility skepticism 
is a ‘contender’ in the debates about free will and moral responsibility. To rule out such 
skepticism from the start is dialectically infelicitous (within the relevant dialectical 
context).
But van Inwagen might still insist that, in the event of his coming to be convinced 
that determinism were true, he would hold on to the belief in free will and moral 
10 Van Inwagen 1983, 109.   11 Van Inwagen 1983, 110.
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responsibility and abandon his belief in the Principle. It is mysterious what would allow 
him to reject the Principle. As discussed earlier, it is unclear how he could sensibly give 
it up for no reason, and if there would be a reason to give it up, then it seems that there 
already is such a reason. But set this point aside. I claim that it is just unclear how van 
Inwagen could explain his preference for freedom and responsibility over the Principle. 
Antecedently anyway, it wouldn’t seem obvious that our status as free and morally 
responsible agents stands on firmer footing than the Principle.
Here is a further point. I would contend that the Consequence Argument does not 
depend essentially on the Principle. That is, the Consequence Argument can be pre-
sented without explicit or implicit reliance on the Principle (or any related transfer of 
powerlessness principle).12 If I am correct on this point, then the only way van Inwagen 
could maintain that we are indeed free and morally responsible, were he convinced 
that determinism were true, would be to reject the Principle of the Fixity of the Past or 
the Principle of the Fixity of the Laws. But again it is completely unclear that these 
Principles are (or would be) less plausible than our status as free and morally responsi-
ble agents, or on what basis van Inwagen could reject them in order to maintain his 
belief in our freedom and moral responsibility.
The considerations I’ve offered reveal that, on the latest interpretation, van Inwagen’s 
thinking is incomplete in important respects. Why would it be independently plausi-
ble, under the assumption of determinism—and apart from wishful thinking—that 
one should be less confident in the Principle than our status as free and morally 
responsible agents? And if, as I believe, the Consequence Argument does not depend 
on the Principle, why would it be independently plausible that our status as free 
and morally responsible agents should trump the Principles of the Fixity of the Past 
and the Laws?
Consider some of what van Inwagen says about the laws of nature:
It is quite conceivable that human power will grow to the extent that we shall one day be 
able to alter the stars in their courses. But we shall never be able to do anything about the 
laws of nature. . . . [T]he laws of nature impose limits on our abilities: they are partly deter-
minative of what it is possible for us to do. And indeed this conclusion is hardly more than 
a tautology.13
In light of his strong defense of the Principle of the Fixity of the Laws, how could he 
reasonably reject that principle in favor of our freedom and responsibility—highly 
contested notions indeed—if he were to be convinced that determinism obtains? 
Similar considerations also apply to the Principle of the Fixity of the Past.
12 Fischer and Ravizza 1996. It should be noted that Van Inwagen disagrees, claiming that all versions of 
the Consequence Argument depend on the Transfer Principle (his Principle Beta): see, for instance, van 
Inwagen 1983, 57 where he claims that the three versions of the argument he presents ‘stand or fall together.’
13 Van Inwagen 1983, 61 and 62.
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To sum up. In light of my argument, it seems that van Inwagen cannot easily maintain 
his libertarianism. On one hand, if he keeps libertarianism, he’s subject to the criticism 
that he is willing to hold to, or reject, putatively fundamental principles simply to get 
what he wants in the argument. This is dialectically uncomfortable. On the other hand, 
if van Inwagen can’t flip-flop, then our fundamental status as free and morally respon-
sible agents hangs on a thread. Freedom will be held hostage to the theoretical physi-
cists. This is a significant cost of libertarianism.
Libertarianism and Theism
Just as it is uncomfortable to have one’s most basic views about one’s freedom and 
moral responsibility hang on a thread, it is likewise uncomfortable to have one’s belief 
in God held hostage to the possible discovery that determinism is true. If one does 
believe in God, then presumably a belief in God is a central feature of one’s intellectual 
and affective orientation. So, it is a strike against a position that it so conceptualizes 
freedom that someone would have to give up her belief in God, if determinism were 
true. Given that flip-flopping (or the disposition to do so) is not an option, then the 
libertarian must indeed give up her belief in God, under the circumstance in which 
she becomes convinced that determinism is true.
Let us focus on a libertarian who is also a theist. And allow me to stipulate—what 
is certainly not implausible—that the theist holds that belief in human freedom is 
necessary in order to justify or defend belief in God. Perhaps the theist holds that 
only those individuals who freely accept God’s forgiveness could legitimately be 
saved, or that only those individuals who freely reject it can be damned. Or perhaps 
the theist holds that free will is a key component of a defense against the problem 
of evil. In any case, I shall simply assume that the theist I’m talking about must 
hold that human beings are free. I’ll make use of the shorthand: theism requires 
freedom.
Given that theism requires freedom, and that flip-flopping is not an acceptable 
option, it would seem that a libertarian theist would have to give up her belief in God, if 
she were to learn that determinism holds. But then one of the libertarian theist’s most 
central and fundamental beliefs will be held hostage to whether the natural laws have 
associated with them 100 percent probabilities or something less. And this seems 
uncomfortable.
Now it might be objected that a true belief in a certain sort of God would entail 
the falsity of determinism. If one believed in a God who has the power to intervene 
in the world and prevent events that otherwise would have occurred, then it would 
follow that determinism is necessarily false insofar as the required entailments 
from truths about the past to truths about the present won’t be secured. After all, 
given that such-and-such occurred in the past, it is still open to God to intervene 
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and thus disrupt the expected connection between such-and-such in the past 
and so-and-so in the future. So, perhaps a libertarian theist can avoid the problem 
that her theism hangs on a thread by claiming that determinism is necessarily 
false.
Leaving aside the implausibility of claiming that determinism is necessarily false 
(and that we can know this from our armchair, as it were), I don’t think that this move 
will help the libertarian theist. Note that what is envisaged is that God has the power to 
intervene to prevent an agent from behaving as he otherwise would have; but clearly if 
God were to exercise this power, God would thereby obliterate the agent’s libertarian 
freedom. And this fact helps to generate an argument for the lack of (libertarian) free-
dom in such a scenario.
We can suppose, then, that causal conditions are such that the entailments would go 
through but for the existence of God (construed as above). Let’s also suppose that a 
God who has the power to intervene in the world exists. Now we assume that Wilson 
mows his lawn on Wednesday afternoon. Given the assumptions above, we also know 
that if Wilson had done otherwise (i.e. if Wilson had held off mowing his lawn on 
Wednesday), then either the past would have been different, some actual law of nature 
would not have obtained, or God would have intervened. But if Wilson’s doing 
 otherwise would require the past to have been different, then it is at least plausible that 
he was not able to do otherwise (from the Principle of the Fixity of the Past). And if 
Wilson’s doing otherwise would require the laws to have been different, then it was at 
least plausible that he was not able to do otherwise (from the Principle of the Fixity of 
the Laws). And if Wilson’s doing otherwise would have been as a result of God’s inter-
vention, then Wilson surely lacked the power to do otherwise in the sense in question. 
That is to say, in this scenario he would not have libertarian freedom, in the sense 
required for moral responsibility.
Thus, the libertarian theist is not helped by invoking the thought that, assuming 
theism, determinism would be necessarily false. And given the unavailability of a dis-
position toward metaphysical flip-flopping (of the sort discussed earlier), a libertarian 
theist would always be in an uncomfortable spot. She would have to give up her belief 
in God, if the scientists were to show that determinism were true. I contend that this 
is a significant, if not decisive, cost of libertarianism, when the view is joined with 
theism.
Conclusion
I have argued that metaphysical flip-flopping is untenable. Thus, some of the most fun-
damental beliefs held by libertarians—about freedom, moral responsibility, and per-
haps God—are in jeopardy. These important beliefs ‘hang on a thread,’ in the sense that 
we would have to abandon them, given an acceptance of libertarianism, if scientists 
were to convince us that causal determinism is true. One advantage of compatibilism, 
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in all of its forms (classical and semicompatibilism), is that it does not put these 
fundamental beliefs at risk as libertarianism does.14, 15
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